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HE RECENT REPORT on deposit insurance reform by the Department of the Treasury (1991) calls for stronger enforcement of bank capital requirements. Among the recommended changes is "prompt corrective action" by supervisors in dealing with undercapitalized banks.1 Under the Treasury's plan, banks would be divided into five groups, based on their capital ratios. Those with the highest capital ratios would be subject to the fewest restrictions. As an incentive to maintain relatively high capital ratios, holding companies with banks in this first group would be permitted to engage in nonbanking activities. As banks move downward into groups with lower capital ratios, they would be subject to increasingly stringent sanctions, including restrictions on their dividends and the growth of their assets. Banks in the lowest group, with relatively low but still positive capital ratios, would be closed unless their shareholders promptly injected new capital.2 Prompt corrective action by bank regulators is intended to reduce both the number of bank failures and the losses by the deposit insurance fund. The Treasury proposal would reduce the discretion that bank supervisors have in handling troubled banks, making the sanctions against banks with relatively low capital ratios mandatory. The policy is designed to give healthy banks the incentive to keep their capital ratios above the critical levels at which they would be subject to mandatory sanctions. Prompt corrective action also would constrain the actions of undercapitalized banks which might increase exposure of the deposit insurance fund to losses and give the owners of banks with relatively low capital ratios the incentive to inject capital into their banks promptly, if they wish to retain control of their banks.
The effectiveness of the proposed policy in achieving its goals of lower bank failure rates and reduced losses to the deposit insurance 1 Department of the Treasury (1991), pp. 38-42, and Chapter X. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1991) recently recommended a different system of prompt corrective action by bank supervisors. The GAO's proposal requires that the actions of supervisors be tied to specific unsafe banking practices, defined more broadly than capital ratios below some required level, The GAO study criticizes the Treasury proposal for focusing too narrowly on these ratios. fund depend on whether the actions to be taken by supervisors under the new policy differ substantially from the actions taken by super-I visors in recent years in dealing with undercapitalized banks. The case for the policy of pronipt corrective action rests on the assumption that, for a given capital ratio of a bank, I sanctions under the proposed policy would be more severe than those imposed by supervisors in recent years. In essence, the Treasury pro-I posal is based on the view that supervisors in the past have permitted banks to remain undercapitalized for overly long periods and that I undercapitalized banks have been permitted to engage in activities that made them more likely to fail and more likely to increase the deposit insurance fund's losses.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the behavior of troubled commercial banks in recent years is consistent with these I assumptions. The paper looks at banks whose capital ratios fell below the minimum required level for periods longer than one year. It ex-I amines whether these undercapitalized banks violated the types of constraints that would be imposed under the Treasury's scheme for prompt I corrective action. The paper also considers whether such violations reduced the chances that the banks would, once again, achieve acceptable capital ratios.
ENFORCEMENT OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
I In 1983, federal supervisory agencies established minimum capital requirements for all I commercial banks. The minimum ratio of primary capital to total assets was set at 5.5 percent. This minimum remained in effect until the end of 1990, when supervisors began phasing in new I risk-based capital requirements. The shaded insert lays out the coniponents of primary capital and total assets used to calculate the primary I capital ratio and indicates the effects of loan losses on this ratio.
Because the objective of this paper is to cx-I amine how rigorously and consistently supervisors have enforced capital requirements in recent years, it is necessary to identify undercapi-I talized banks in terms of the capital requirements in effect at the time. This paper defines undercapitalized banks as those with primary capital ratios below 5.5 percent. The proposed 17 policy of prompt corrective action might specify higher capital levels as the critical levels for mandatory actions.
This paper examines the behavior of banks whose primary capital ratios remained below 5.5 percent for more than four consecutive quarters between 1985 and 1989. This choice of period reflects the fact that most capital injections occur in the fourth quarter of each year, perhaps because of the practice of "window dressing," where banks devote special attention to the capital ratios that appear on their yearend balance sheets. By focusing on more than four consecutive quarters, we include only those banks whose primary capital ratios remained below 5.5 percent through the fourth quarter of the year in which they first became undercapitalized. Figure 1 illustrates some of the characteristics of the banks included in this study. Undercapitalized banks fall into three groups. Those in one group quickly raised their capital ratios by increasing their capital and/or reducing their assets. Another group consists of those that were closed quickly by their supervisors. Clearly, no banks in these two groups remained undercapitalized for long. This study focuses on a third group of banks -those that remained undercapitalized for more than four consecutive quarters.
Slow Response to Enforcement Actions
There are several reasons why banks can remain undercapitalized for more than a year. Some banks respond more slowly than others to directives from supervisors to raise their capital ratios, in part because they know that supervisors lack the authority to close them because of their low capital ratios alone. Instead, banks must be judged insolvent (that is, with zero or negative net worth) or nonviable by their chartering agencies to justify closure.
Supervisors do have a variety of enforcement actions that they can take against undercapitalized banks short of closing them down. Among the more severe are the removal of their officers, the imposition of fines and the termination of insurance coverage on the banks' deposits. Supervisors generally try first to induce a bank to comply with banking regulations with less formal or severe enforcement actions, like writ- 
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remain undercapitalized for so long, these banks should at the very least not have experienced rapid asset growth, paid dividends to shareholders or increased their loans to insiders. This paper investigates whether banks that were undercapitalized for more than a year indeed conformed to these constraints. Table 1 indicates that 531 federally insured commercial banks were undercapitalized for more than a year, about 4 percent of the average number of banks operating in the years 1985-89.°T he vast majority (87 percent) of these inadequately capitalized banks were relatively small, with total assets of less than $100 million. Undercapitalized banks whose assets exceeded $100 million were concentrated in the energyproducing states of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas (83 percent). Only one undercapitalized bank (located in California) had total assets greater than $1 billion.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDERCAPITALIZED BANKS
Outside Texas, a majority of the undercapitalized banks (60 percent) were state nonmember banks, supervised by the FDIC. In Texas, in contrast, 73 percent were national banks, supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (0CC). 7
As table I shows, a sizable proportion of the 531 banks had primary capital ratios below 5.5 percent for two years or more. In this 20-quarter period , 178 banks had primary capital ratios below the minimum level for eight or more consecutive quarters, and six had capital ratios below this level for 16 or more quarters. Some of these observations may reflect lags in the process by which supervisors get information on banks and arrange for their resolution; they are not necessarily evidence of supervisory policies that permit banks with negative equity to remain in operation. Indeed, for most of these banks, the period of negative equity lasted only one or two quarters. Some banks, however, had under the same federal supervisory authorities in the years 1985-89. t See the shaded insert for a description of equity capital and the type of accounting entries that can make equity capital negative. 
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negative equity for extended periods of time. Of the 72 banks with negative equity for four or more quarters, 83 percent were in Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas; two national banks in Texas had negative equity for nine quarters. The last column of table I shows the number of undercapitalized banks that recovered, that is, had primary capital ratios consistently above 5.5 percent, by the fourth quarter of l989.~Only 130 of the 531 banks had recovered by IV/1989, an average recovery rate of only 24 percent. The 46 percent rate of recovery for banks outside of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas is much higher than the 10 percent recovery rate for banks undercapitalized for more than a year in these energy-producing states.
As might be expected, the recovery rates were significantly lower for banks with negative equity. Of the 213 banks with negative equity for at least one quarter, the recovery rate was only 6.57 percent, compared with a recovery rate of 36.48 percent among the remaining 318 banks. '°T he geographic distribution of the 531 undercapitalized banks is quite uneven. For instance, 14 states and the District of Columbia had no banks that were undercapitalized for more than a year. While these 14 are not clustered in any particular part of the country, they have one characteristic in common-relatively liberal branching laws (see table 2 ). Eleven of the 14 states permit statewide branching and the three I 9 One objection to this definition of recovery is that it understates the actual recovery rate, because many banks' capital ratios fell below 5.5 percent only near the end of the 1985-89 period. This possibility is investigated I by examining capital ratios in the first three quarters of 1990 for those banks whose primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 1989. Reclassifying these banks as recovered if their primary capital ratios I rose consistently above 5.5 percent in the first three quarters of 1990 raises the recovery rate from 10 percent to 12.5 percent in the energy-producing states and from 46 percent to 55.5 percent in the other states. The significance of these increases in recovery rates may be I offset by the possibility that some other banks, previously classified as recovered, might be reclassified if their capital ratios for 1990 were examined. Since examination of 1990 data did not change the recovery rates substantially, the recovery rates cited in the text are those based on observations through lV/1989. 10 The difference between these proportions is significant at As table 2 indicates, many of the banks that failed during 1985-89 were not undercapitalized for a year or longer. Instead, they were closed within a year after their capital ratios fell below the minimum required level. For instance, 17 banks failed in the 14 states that had no banks undercapitalized for more than a year. In the nation, the number of banks that failed exceeded the number that were undercapitalized for more than a year. These observations suggest that many bank failures in recent years cannot be attributed to actions taken by banks while ondercapitalized for e~aendedperiods of time; many banks failed before their primary capital ratios had fallen below the minimum required level for a year or longer, and many banks that were undercapitalized for extended periods of time did not fail.
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ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTRAINTS ON UNDERCAPITALIZED BANKS
The Treasury proposal for prompt corrective action is hased on the view that supervisors have delayed too long in imposing constraints on undercapitalized banks. This section investigates whether the banks that were undercapitalized for over more than a year violated the types of constraints that would he imposed under the Treasury proposal.
Two constraints on the behavior of undercapitalized banks mentioned in the Treasury proposal are examined here: constraints on asset growth and dividend payments.' 2 A third constraint is also investigated: no increase in loans to bank officers and directors (the bank insiders) while a bank is undercapitalized. An examination of insider loans is included because supervisory authorities often focus on such loans when monitoring the condition of undercapitalized banks. Also, undercapitalized savings and loan associations in the recent past were found to have increased the losses to their deposit insurance funds through loans to insiders, and one study has found that banks with relatively high ratios of insider lending to total assets had lower earnings and higher bank failure rates than other banks" Table 3 presents selected information about the behavior of undercapitalized banks. The results are divided into regions, except for Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas, which account for most of the undercapitalized banks. This method of presentation highlights both regional concentrations of undercapitalized banks and differences in bank behavior-.
Asset Growth
When the capital ratio of a bank falls to a relatively low level, its shareholders have less to lose and, correspondingly, more to gain by assuming additional risk, in the hope of a sufficiently large turnaround in income to eliminate the capital deficiency. One way that a bank assumes additional risk is to increase its assets. Bank supervisors, of course, prefer to see undercapitalized banks reduce their assets, to raise their capital ratios.
Most of the 531 banks reduced their assets substantially while undercapitalized, consistent with the desires of bank supervisors. A sizable number, however, actually experienced rapid asset growth. At 84 banks (16 percent of the total), asset growth exceeded 10 percent while primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent; in fact, asset growth exceeded 25 percent at 44 undercapitalized banks. Kummer, Arshadi and Lawrence (1989) . ' 4 Twelve banks with asset growth in excess of 10 percent were involved in mergers during the periods in which their primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent. Mergers distort the measure of asset growth for the purposes of this paper, because they increase capital and assets. Asset growth of banks engaged in mergers does not necessarily reflect greater leverage. Some mergers, for example, involve subsidiaries of the same holding companies, which do not change the leverage of these holding companies. For each of these 12 banks, asset growth in the period in which their primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent is measured as the percentage change in the period before or after the merger, whichever is the longer. 
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creditworthiness. If, however, a bank's capital (and, hence, its capital ratio) has fallen to a relatively low level, shareholders may exert less constraint on insider lending simply because they have less to lose Therefore, when banks become undercapitalized, supervisory actions to limit insider loans take on greater importance in limiting the deposit insurance fund's losses. Table 3 displays information on the number of undercapitalized banks that reported their highest levels of insider lending ivhile undercapitalized This measure is important because it reflects the maximum exposure by these banks to losses on such loans. A sizable minority of the banks (about 24 percent) reported their highest levels of insider loans when their capital ratios were below the minimum required level)'
Djfferences in Constraints Across Supervisors
Differences in practices among the super visors of commercial banks may explain some of the variation in behavior among the undercapitalized banks As noted above, most undercapi talized banks with rapid asset growth were na tional banks located in Texas In Texas, however, national banks are a majority of all commercial banks in the state. The concentration of national banks in Texas among the various groups of undercapitalized banks may reflect simply the relatively large share of national banks in Texas Table 4 examines the behavior of Texas banks by federal supervisory agency. 'The first row presents the distribution of these banks by their federal supervisory agency The following rows show the numbers of undercapitalized banks in various categories by federal supervisory agency. Below the numbers of undercapitalized banks are their percentages of the total number of Texas banks supervised by the same federal agency. Asterisks indicate whether the proportions for national banks are significantly different from those for state-chartered insured banks Table 4 shows substantial differences in the representation of national and state-chartered banks among the undercapitalized banks in Texas Almost 18 percent of the national banks had primary capital ratios below 5.5 percent for more than four consecutive quarters, compared with about 8 percent for state-chartered banks Over 6 percent of national banks were undercapitalized for eight or more consecutive quarters, compared with 1.8 percent for state chartered banks Most of the banks with negative equity are national banks, especially those with negative equity for four or more quarters National banks also account for most of the undercapitalized banks with rapid asset growth. Table 5 makes the same comparisons among national and state-chartered insured banks outside of Texas The only significant differences in proportions for banks outside of Texas involve undercapitalized banks with negative equity Significantly higher proportions of national banks had negative equity than for state-chartered banks The other differences in proportions are not significantly different from zero. Thus, the relatively high concentrations of national banks among the various groups of undercapitalized banks were primarily in Texas
The Behavior of Undercapitalized Banks and their Recovery Rates
Because some undercapitalized banks violated the constraints that would be imposed under the 'I'reasury proposal for prompt corrective action, we can test whether these constraints would have had a positive effect on bank capital recovery rates If such constraints tend to increase the recovery rate, we should expect lower recovery rates among the banks that violated these constraints. 20
"The 12 banks involved in mergers while undercapitalized may have had their insider loans rise while undercapitalized because they merged with banks that had insider loans before the mergers. To avoid such biases, these 12 banks are classified among those that did not have their highest level of insider loans while undercapitalized. 2OThis paper compares recovery rates across banks rather than failure rates because the distinction between failed and surviving banks is rather arbitrary in some cases. For example, banks with negative equity for several consecutive quarters would be classified as survivors simply because they remained in operation. Table 6 compares the recovery rates of banks that violated the constraints with those that did not. The recovery rates of the two groups of banks are not significantly different. The recovery rate for banks that paid dividends is slightly higher than that for the other undercapitalized banks, although this difference is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the other observed differences are not significantly different from zero. of banks. If a bank's capital ratio fell below the level acceptable to supervisors, it would be subject to mandatory constraints on its behavior. This proposal for prompt corrective action would limit the discretion of supervisors in dealing with undercapitalized banks. The proposal's objective is to reduce the number of bank failures and the losses by the deposit insurance fund. Advocates of the proposal assume that imposing sanctions on banks whose capital ratios fall below critical levels would give the managers of healthy banks the incentive to keep their capital ratios above the critical levels at which the sanctions become mandatory. By authorizing the closing of banks with low but positive capital ratios, the proposal gives shareholders of undercapitalized banks incentive to inject capital promptly, if they wish to retain control of their banks. Finally, the sanctions are assumed to constrain the types of behaviors that make undercapitalized banks more likely to fail and to increase the losses of the deposit insurance fund. 
CONCLUSIONS
Bank supervisoi-y reform is a major component of the overall plan for deposit insurance reform recently proposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Under this proposal, supervision would be based on the capital ratios 2t Daht and Spivey (1991) report similar results. They examine the characteristics of undercapitalized banks that help distinguish between those that once again have capital ratios above the required level and those that do not recover. They find that asset growth and dividends do not help distinguish between the banks that recover and those that do not.
MAY/JUNE ieai in the years 1985-89, many banks remained in operation for extended periods of time with primary capital ratios below the minimum required level. Substantial minorities of these undercapitalized banks violated the constraints that would be imposed under the proposed policy of prompt corrective action. This behavior, presumably, would not be permitted under the proposed policy.
The evidence does not support the hypothesis that once the capital ratio of a bank falls below the minimum required level, enforcing the sanctions specified in the ireasury proposal would increase the chances that the undercapitalized bank will recover. 'The recovery rates of undercapitalized banks that violated these constraints were no lower than the recovery rates of other undercapitalized banks. Data are not available to test the hypothesis that the failures of the banks violating the constraints specified in the proposal for prompt corrective action imposed relatively large losses on the deposit insurance fund.
Thus, if the proposed policy of prompt corrective action can be expected to reduce the rate of bank failure, this effect must work through the incentives for healthy banks to keep their capital ratios relatively high. To draw conclusions about the strength of this incentive, it is necessary to make assumptions about how bank management would view the penalties to be imposed on banks with and without legislation requiring prompt corrective action by supervisors. Evidence presented in this paper indicates that the sanctions imposed on undercapitaliz~banks in recent years have been similar to those to be imposed under the proposed policy.
First, several hundred banks were closed in recent years shortly after their capital ratios fell below the minimum required level. Their failure did not result from violation of the types of constraints that would be imposed under the Treasury proposal. Resolutions of these cases appear to have been handled much as they would under the policy of prompt corrective action.
Second, while a large number of banks had capital ratios below the required level for more than a year, most of them did not violate the constraints to be imposed under the policy of prompt corrective action.
indeed, the fact that a large share of the cases in which undercapitalized banks violated these constraints involves banks in one state under the jurisdiction of one super-visory agency suggests that such cases are the exception, rather than the norm. Thus, there is some evidence that the nature of bank supervision in recent years provided banks with the incentive to keep their capital ratios above the required level without additional legislation.
The evidence on recovery rates of the banks that were undercapitalized for more than a year provides empirical support for one element of the Treasury proposal: the prompt closing of banks with low but positive capital ratios unless their shareholders act promptly to raise their capital ratios. As this paper shows, only 24 percent of the undercapitalized banks recovered in the period examined. Thus, the Treasury proposal would not result in premature closings of large numbers of banks that ultimately would recover if given enough time.
